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Abstract 
 
We build a model of voluntary and costly expressive voting, where the relative weight of 
ideology and valence issues over voting costs determines how people vote and if they actually 
turn out to vote. In line with the conventional rational calculus approach, the model predicts 
that the cost of voting depresses voter turnout. Against the conventional wisdom, though, high 
voting cost/low turnout elections tend to have a larger share of voters for whom the common 
value signal on candidates’ valence matches their private value views, thus raising the chances 
that high valence candidates are elected. 
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1. Introduction 
The conventional premise that high or nearly universal rates of voter participation are desirable 
(Lijphart, 1997) does not seem to receive widespread support in recent theoretical research. In 
particular, within a framework where voters have private values and commonly shared values 
and vote in an instrumental way, Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) prove that a switch from private 
to common value voting might lead both to lower turnout and to better selection of agents, and 
Aldashev (2015) shows that lower turnout due to higher ideological mobility of voters actually 
reduces equilibrium rents by self-interested politicians. 
We contribute to this strand of literature by developing a model where voters receive an 
informative signal about the valence of candidates that may or not match their ideological 
preferences. As the cost of voting increases, turnout unambiguously decreases, and, more 
interestingly, the composition of voters changes so that, eventually, only voters for whom the 
common value signal on candidates’ valence matches their private value views will choose to 
turn out. This implies that the elected candidate’s win margin increases in the cost of voting 
and, above a certain threshold, the valent candidate is elected by a plebiscitary vote. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
We assume that two candidates (l,r) run for office. The candidate securing the majority of the 
votes of the electorate in a ‘winner-takes-all’ race sets the one-dimensional policy , where 
  , 	
, based on his ideology. 
Voting is voluntary, costly, and driven by two expressive motives (Hamlin and Jennings, 
2011): a private value motive (ideology) and a common value motive (valence). Voter j is 
ideologically attached to candidate x with probability 0.5, meaning that no candidate enjoys a 
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systematic ideological bias. Valence is instead a commonly valued issue linked to imperfectly 
observed candidates’ inner characteristics, as competence or probity (Besley, 2005). 
Voters’ behavior consists of two stages. First, the relative weight of ideology and valence 
issues determines whether, conditional on turning out to vote, individuals vote according to 
ideology or valence. Second, the comparison of the benefits with the costs of voting determines 
whether people turn out to vote. Each voter j has a set of beliefs  , , with    , 	
 being 
the ideological attachment to either of the candidates’ policies, and    , 	
 voter j’s belief 
about candidates’ valence. Candidate x is valent in state of the world    , 
, with the 
two states of the world being equally likely ex ante, and voter j receives a signal   such that 
	 = | =  =  > 0.5. The valence signal may or may not match a voter’s ideological 
preference  .  
Based on their sets of beliefs, voters can be categorized as ideological if the benefit of voting 
by ideology is larger than the benefit of voting by valence, and conditional on turning out, they 
vote according to ι irrespective of κ, or pragmatic if the benefit of voting by valence is larger 
than the benefit of voting by ideology, and vote according to κ irrespective of ι. 
As for the turnout decision, the net benefit of turning out to vote ( ) is: 
  = !"# + %  & − (             #)      =  max# , % − (        #)      ≠   (1) 
where i is the benefit of voting by ideology, v is the benefit of voting for the candidate that is 
believed to be valent, and c is the cost of voting. A voter turns out to vote (. = 1) if the net 
benefit is positive: 
. = 1(  > 0) (2) 
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We hypothesize that % = 2 + 3 , where V is a positive parameter, and 3 is independently 
and uniformly distributed on 4−5, 5 6, with 0 ≤ 5 ≤ 2, and that 843|#6 = 0. As for ideology, 
i is assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed on 40, 9 6 , with  9 > 2 , and 
cumulative distribution function  Φ = ;
<
. The voting cost ( is allowed to be correlated across 
voters due to the fact that individuals residing in a jurisdiction face the same or similar 
conditions. 
Figure 1 offers a graphical representation of the forces determining how and whether people 
vote. Voters are ordered according to the relevance of i, with Φ on the horizontal axis indexing 
voters’ cumulative distribution function.1 Assume that % is constant across voters (5 = 0), 
and that  9 > 22, implying that the majority of voters are ideological.2  Figure 1 first depicts 
how people vote. The fraction of voters Φ = >
<
 have # < 2 and vote pragmatically, while the 
fraction 1 − >
<
 have # > 2, and vote ideologically. 
As for the turnout decision, voters for whom the valence signal matches their ideological 
views have benefits from turning out to vote as given by the solid straight line m (i+%) in Figure 
1, while ‘no match’ voters - for whom valence signals are clashing with ideological views - 
have benefits described by the solid piecewise linear curve nm (max#, %
). Say that the cost of 
voting is homogeneous across voters at ( = ( > 0. According to (1) and (2), all voters for 
whom the benefits from voting (m or nm) exceed c will turn out, while the others will abstain. 
 
                                                          
1The actual shape and position of the cumulative distribution of the ideological value of voting is likely to vary 
depending on institutions (Revelli, 2016). Here, we take them as given and focus on the role of circumstances 
determining the cost of voting. 
2
 I=2V implies that exactly half the electorate is ideological and half is pragmatic. All graphs in this section are 
drawn by setting: V=3; I=8; q=0.7. 
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Consider now the effect of the cost of voting on pragmatic voters’ turnout .(%): 
.(%) =
@AA
B
AAC
29        #)     ( < 2
29 − (29        #)     2 < ( < 22
0         #)     ( > 22
 
(3) 
As Figure 2 shows, all pragmatic voters D>< E turn out when ( < 2, while none of them 
participates when ( > 22 even if the signal matches their ideological views. For 2 < ( < 22, 
the only pragmatic voters that turn out are those for whom the valence signal matches their 
ideological views (i.e., are on line m), and the total benefits from voting exceed costs: # + 2 >
(. On the other hand, ideological voters’ turnout .(#) declines with the cost of voting according 
to: 
.(#) =
@AA
AAB
AAA
AC 1 − 29        #)     ( < 21 − 229 − (29         #)      2 < ( < 221 + 229 − (9       #)    22 < ( < 912 + 229 − (29       #)   9 < ( < 2 + 9
     0          #)      ( > 2 + 9
 
(4) 
All ideological voters D1 − >< E turn out for ( < 2, while a fraction FG D(9 − 29E of them - i.e., 
those for which the valence signal does not match their ideological stance (line nm) and # < ( 
- abstain if 2 < ( < 22. For ( > 22, some of the ‘match’ ideological voters abstain too (those 
that are located close to ><  on line m in Figure 1, and for whom # + 2 > (). As the cost of 
voting further increases (( > 9), the only voters participating in the election have a valence 
signal coinciding with their ideological views. Finally, turnout falls to zero for ( > 2 + 9. 
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As a result of (3) and (4), total turnout t is: 
. =
@A
AB
AA
C 1             #)     ( < 2
1 + 229 − (9           #)      2 < ( < 912 + 229 − (29          #)   9 < ( < 2 + 9
    0               #)      ( > 2 + 9
 
(5) 
As the cost increases, turnout falls and the process goes on until only ideological voters 
whose signal about the valence of the candidate matches their political beliefs turn out (for 9 <
( < 2 + 9). Let .(#)H  and .(#)IH  denote the turnout rates of ideological voters when the 
signal matches or does not match their ideological views. Given that pragmatic voters turn out 
at the rate .(%) and always vote according to their valence signals, the probability of electing 
the valent candidate is: 
(%) = 4.(%) + .(#)H6 + .(#)IH(1 − ).  (6) 
 
=       
@AA
AB
AAA
C J29 + 12 K1 − 29 LM  + 12 K1 − 29 L (1 − )      #)     ( < 2
     12 29  + 12 D1 − (9E12 29 + D1 − (9E                        #)      2 < ( < 9
                                     #)      ( > 9
 
 
In Figure 3, (%) falls as the cost of voting surpasses V due to the fact that pragmatic voters 
for whom the signal collides with their (weak) ideological stances (corresponding to horizontal 
segment 2N in Figure 1) abstain, so that ‘good voters’ are lost to the democratic process 
because of the rise in the cost of voting. This result is compatible with the view (Aldashev, 
2015) that a decline in turnout might lead to the selection of less valent candidates. For  ( > 2, 
though, the probability of electing the valent candidate increases with c. As c rises, the share of 
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voters casting their votes according to the correct signal increases relative to the share of 
ideological voters blindly voting against their signals. (%) keeps on increasing until cost I is 
reached, where only ideological voters for whom the valence signal matches their ideological 
views (corresponding to segment ℎ42 + 96 in Figure 1) turn out to vote. 
At ( ≥ 9, all those who turn out vote according to their valence signal, and (%) equals q. 
It is easily verified that (%) at ( < 2 is strictly lower than q if  > 0.5. Consequently, the 
probability of electing the valent candidate is maximized when the voting cost is at least as 
large as I. Somewhat unexpectedly, maximization of the chances of electing a valent candidate 
requires both pragmatic voters and ideological voters whose signal does not match their 
ideological views to abstain, and only the subgroup of radical voters for whom the common 
value signal matches their private value views to show up at the polls.  
Finally, call Q the win margin of the elected candidate, defined as the difference in votes 
between the two candidates divided by the votes gained by the elected candidate: 
Q =
@A
AB
AA
C
 
1 −  RSDFTUV EUV WRSDFTUV E      #)        ( < 2
1 −  DFTXVEUV WDFTXVE         #)      2 < ( < 9
   1             #)     ( >    9
  
 
(7) 
The win margin of the elected candidate first decreases in c. However, the win margin is strictly 
increasing in ( for ( > 2, and equals 100% when ( > 9. Thus, when only radical ideological 
voters for whom the valence signal matches their views turn out at the polls, the valent candidate 
is elected by a plebiscitary vote. 
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3. Concluding remarks 
We have built an expressive voting model where the weight of the ideological content of a 
policy - say, a high versus a low income tax rate - relative to the valence of candidates 
determines whether, conditional on turning out to vote, individuals vote according to ideology 
or valence, and the comparison of the expressive benefits from voting with the cost of voting 
determines whether people turn out to vote. The model predicts that a higher cost of voting 
raises the chances of electing the most valent candidate due to a selection mechanisms whereby 
low turnout elections tend to be characterized by a larger share of voters for whom the common 
value signal matches their private value views. 
Of course, our model does not imply that low voter turnout contests should always be 
preferable to high voter turnout ones, nor that efforts to raise voters’ democratic participation 
are misplaced. Rather, it suggests that the distribution of the relative strength of ideological 
versus pragmatic motives in the population of potential voters is a crucial factor in predicting 
to what extent the actual rate of voters’ participation in elections is going to affect the 
characteristics of the elected officials and the quality of their policies. 
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